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IN recent years the residual powers of the First Hall of the Civil 
Court h ave been highlighted by s. 47 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Malta, which provides that redress in respect of the 
enforcemen t of the protective provisions contained in the Con­
stitution is to be sought from that Court and furthennore that when 
any question arises before any court, other than the Constitutional 
Court and the First Hall, Civil Court, as to the contravention of 
any of the aforesaid protective provisions, the court, before whom 
the question arises, is to refer the question to the Civil Court, 
First Hall, unless in its opinion the raising of the question is 
merely frivolous or vexatious and its findings, subject to appeal 
to the Constitutional Court, are binding on any court which has 
so referred the matter. 
The Civil Court, First Hall, in Malta, however, is not only 
vested with the powers which are conferred on it as is the case of 
the other Courts of Law in Malta. In practice it also has jurisdic­
tion to decide where jurisdiction lies and to declare whether any 
particular body has acted in terms of its jurisdiction and in ac­
cordance with the provisions of the law. Mutatis mutandis this cor­
responds to the jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench Division in the 
U.K. to review decisions of inferior bodies to see whether they 
have acted within their jurisdiction. Recently the Civil Court, 
First Hall, clearly asserted that: 
"M'hemmx dubju, kif sewwa jirrileva 1-attur, Ii, f 'kazi simili, 
il-Qorti taghna kostantement asserew il-j edd Ii jissindikaw jekk 
provvediment ikunx jemana mill-awtorita kompetenti u fid-debita 
fonna." (Perici vs Busuttil noe u Buttigieg vs Busuttil, noe 
22/3/1976). 
This comes very close to a declaration that a decision of an 
inferior body may be 'bad.on the face'. The power of the Queen's 
Bench Division in the U.K. to review decisions which were 'bad 
on the face' was trenchantly reaffinned in Rex v. Northumberland 
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Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw (1951) 1 K.B. 711) 
and has been consistently reiterated ever since by U.K. Courts. 
A typical Maltese case which applied a similar solution, with­
out however going into a general discussion of the problem, but 
which in the event certainly affirms the First Hall's power to 
review the findings of the inferior body, is that of Joseph Cutajar 
v. Port Workers' Board {Anthony Farrugia et noe) (24/10/1974). In
that case the Civil Court declared that the Port Workers' Board
had acted not only against the law, but also manifestly ultra vires
and hence the Civil Court declared the findings of the Port Work­
ers' Board as null and consequently revocable by itself. It is
interesting to observe that the Court did not merely declare the
findings null. Instead of referring the matter for the further con­
sideration of the Port Workers' Board, the Civil Court, after find­
ing the nullity, itself revoked the decision.
The interesting implications of the dedsion of an inferior juris­
diction being 'bad on the face' are manifestly important in Ad­
ministrative Law, as power to review the decision of an inferior 
jurisdiction in practice amounts to a right of appeal where the 
Legislature might have failed to provide any, or where it has pro­
vided a limited right of appeal. On the other hand, it is now clear 
that the Legislature itself could bite into this right of review of 
the Civil Court, in the same way as it has bitten into the prin­
ciples of the Rules of Natural Justice where decisions by admin­
istrative bodies are concemed. Where a limited right of appeal is
conferred by the Legislature, it may be argued that the grounds of 
appeal specifically conferred by the Legislature may not be 
widened out by the appellate Court, s ponte ·sua. As the argument 
went in the Police vs Leslie Freedman case (Court of Criminal 
Appeal, 17/3/1977). Since s. 425 of the Criminal Code had speci­
fied the cases in which the Attorney General could appeal against 
the decisions of the Courts of first instance, that Court should not 
extend the Attorney General's right of appeal on the ground that 
the decision of the Court of first instance was 'bad on its face'. 
At the same time it is to be remembered that a right of review 
although tantamount to, is not a right of, appeal; so that that 
Court could have first dealt with the matter as a question of re­
view (not of appeal), and if it found the decision bad on the face, 
it could have declared the nullity. Having done so, that Court 
could then have dealt with the matter in the same way as it deals 
with judgments of a court of first instance which are found to be 
null in view of deficiencies of procedures in tenns of s. 440 of the 
Criminal Code. 
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In the relevant cases of course, the right procedure would be 
that of seeking a declaration of nullity from the Civil Court and 
thereafter a reconsideration of the case by the inferior jurisdic­
tion itself if one is not thereafter time barred. (In the appropriate 
case, the risk t hat an action may be on the way to  being time
barred could amount to a proper plea of urgent treatment by the 
Civil Court.) 
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